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maritime and business history. core New Zealand-UK trade where they knew that they 
would soon have to invest in steam. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent months you may have noticed that our coastal 
shipping industry has been splashing itself across the head-
lines. A Ministry of Transport-sponsored move by the gov-
ernment to deregulate and to throw the coast open to interna-
tional competition has provoked a sharp response. 1 While 
producer boards have welcomed abandoning cabo tage, 
(coastal trade) shipping lines, maritime unions and some 
international maritime experts have queried the wisdom of 
the move in terms that range from the polite but firm to the 
unprintable.' 
The debate is anything but new. About 120 years ago New 
Zealand coastal companies were also drawing up battle lines 
agains t foreign interlopers. Then it was against the British 
lines, one of which, the Albion Line, had placed a steamer 
called Taiaroa in the Dunedin-Timaru trade a few months 
after the Union Steam Ship Company's steamer Bruce at the 
entrance to Otago Harbour late in 1875. Albion was one of 
two big British lines battling it out for control of the New 
Zealand-UK trade with the New Zealand Shipping Company 
formed a couple of years earlier at Christchurch. The Scots 
had come to the obvious conclusion: if they wanted a larger 
share of the bluewater pie (the New Zealand-UK run), it 
would help to control the coastal feeder routes. 
This was bad news for the newly-formed Union Com-
pany. If the other 'big boys' built ships for their own New 
Zealand coastal services, Union's future looked bleak. There-
fore while the Taiaroa and Union's ships fought it out on the 
Timaru run, Union's ambitious young Managing-Director, 
James Mills, had his UK patron, shipbuilder (and Albion Line 
director) Peter Denny, pull strings for him back in Scotland. 
After some spirited bargaining, Union added the Taiaroa to its 
burgeoning fleet in July 1876. With the ship came an assur-
ance that Albion would stay out of the New Zealand coast. In 
return Union agreed to provide feeder services to the Direct 
Lines (as the UK-New Zealand lines were ca lled) without fear 
or favour. ' 
Both sides heaved sighs of relief. Union could now get on 
with what it wanted to do, ruling the coastal routes. The 
Direct Lines- none of which yet owned a single steamer-
This debate sounded some recurring notes. Then, as now, 
local lines resisted 'foreign ' intervention. Then, as now, the 
share capital of the ' local' lines was foreign-controlled. Union 
Steam had started as an amalgam of Otago and Scottish 
capital, but its rapid growth at the expense of local and 
Australian lines had brought in so much additional British 
and Australian capital that by 1878 New Zealanders held 
little more than a quarter of the shares. In 1993 Union remains 
50% Australian owned, the remaining half being in Brierley 
hands- itself with a substantial overseas share-holding. The 
National Government's leading critic, South Pacific Ship-
ping, which operates seven small container ships on the 
Tasman, employs New Zealand crews. But its ships are 
German-owned and German-flagged. One gets the feeling 
that fear of job losses are driving these debates. In 1875 it was 
James Mills's own position. In 1993 concerns are felt more 
widely, by ships' officers, crews and shore support staff. 
But back to the past. I have chosen the period 1875-1975 
for three main reasons: 
1. 1875 saw the introduction of large, compound-engined 
steamers into the coastal trade. These were the first truly 
efficient coastal steamers. 
2. 1875 brought the founding of the Union Steam Ship Com-
pany, the major player in the New Zealand coastal trade for 
much of our history. 
3. 1975 saw the virtual collapse of the conventi.onal general 
cargo trade on the coast. In that year the Northern Steam Ship 
Company laid up its fleet and most of the remnants of the 
Holm, Canterbury and Richardson fleets were discarded. 
The Union Company had abandoned its coastal RO / RO [roll-
on, roll-off] service the year before and would hand over its 
ailing Rangatim Lyttelton ferry service to the Shipping Cor-
poration. 
1875-1905 
What was the shape of the coastal trade in 1875? And in what 
ways was it developing? In 1875 the shorter distance routes 
were in a state of flux. In regions such as Northland, or the 
numerous Auckland local trades, they were growing, as 
merchants pushed out to serve rural communi ties. The scow, 
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New Zealand's best-known indigenous craft, dates from this 
period.' Small ships, owned by mercantile firms such as 
Auckland's Henderson & MacFarlane, or Wellington's Levin 
& Co, were numerically dominant. 
Refrigeration and farming reform intensified these devel-
opments by pushing more business the way of the coastal 
lines. Whereas in the days of sail, ships on the UK run had 
seldom exceeded 1,500 tons, the steamers of the late 1880s 
were topping 5,000 tons . Ports struggled to dredge and to 
extend wharves to remain in the trade. Bluff, Port Chalmers, 
Oamaru etc kept up, but many could not. Cargo formerly 
exported direct now joined the coastal trade flow to the larger 
ports. Richardson & Co. of Napier used its fleet of small 
steamers to carry wool, frozen meat and other produce to the 
larger ports for export. Pa tea sent cheese down to Wellington 
until the late 1950s. Wellington developed a large trade in 
trans-shipments. 
Elsewhere, especially in the important ECSI (East Coast 
South Island), intermodal competition, in the form of the 
expanding rail network, made inroads into the short-haul 
routes. The opening of the PortChalmers-Dunedin railway in 
1872, for example, devastated the harbour trade at Otago. 
Between 1875-80 all of the trading ports between Oamaru and 
Otago Harbour - Kakanui, Moeraki, Allday Bay and 
Waikouaiti - ceased trading. To compensate, the longer-
distance routes grew healthily. Even rail, the new adversary, 
helped by boosting demand for coal, which became a major 
staple of the coastal and intercolonial trades. By the mid-
1880s fleets of colliers were shuttling between the West Coast 
ports and the rest of the colony. 
As far as the passenger and general cargo trades went, the 
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main routes were established fairly early. From Onehunga, 
steamers traded down to the ECSI ports of Lyttelton and 
Dunedin. Others ran from Onehunga to New Plymouth and 
Wellingtonorfrom Wellington toNelsonand the West Coast. 
Later the Union Company's famous Lyttelton ferry service 
gathered strength, although its first purpose-built ship did 
not appear until1907. 
What did the ships carry? Some ports were dominated by 
bulk cargoes; coal at Westport and Greymouth, with coal and 
timber in Northland. Grain products from Oamaru and Ti-
maru, beer, iron goods and assorted manufactured products 
from Dunedin, a mixture of general goods from L yttleton, all 
moved north. Wellington, centrally located, acted as a distri-
bution port for much of New Zealand, handling tranship-
ments. 
Certainly, business boomed. In a recent issue of the New 
Zealand Journal of History, Simon Ville showed that the ton-
nage of coasters entering New Zealand ports increased 10-
fold in the four decades between 1873 and 1914, rising from 
1.5 million tons to 12 million tons.5 This increase was larger 
than that for overseas entrances, which climbed only from 
about 500,000 to just under two million tons. These figures 
should be treated with a little caution, since they are very 
crude. I suspect that increasing ship size and the use by Union 
Company and H uddart Parker of intercolonial ships on coastal 
legs of trans-Tasman voyages may have inflated this. Ton-
nages of cargo handled would be a more accurate measure of 
trade growth than the tonnage of ships entering port: for 
Otago Harbour, one port for which I have detailed statistics, 
coastal tonnage entrances increased from 219,000 tons in 1906 
to 439,000 tons in 1914; for the same period, tonnage handled 
increased from 222,000 tons to just 274,000 tons. More re-
search is needed, conducted on a port-by-port basis. 
Shipping companies underwent considerable change. 
The largest interprovincial trader at the start of this period, 
the Wellington-based New Zealand Steam Ship Company 
(NZSSCo) fell victim to the new Union Company in 1876. 
Thereafter the Union Company snapped up small rivals and 
concluded deals with British companies, reserving the coast 
to itself. In the mid-1880s it achieved a near-monopoly of the 
distribution of the West Coast coal supply. 
This pattern changed little over the remainder of the 
period. Union built a trio of shallow-draft passenger-cargo 
steamers for its West Coast and Onehunga-New Plymouth 
passenger services and began planning its first purpose-built 
Lyttleton-Wellington ship. Larger freighters replaced the 
small ones acquired during the company purchases of the 
late 1870s and the 1880s. Some older trans-Tasman liners 
were stripped of their passenger accommodation and put on 
the main trunk coastal services. 
The Union Company domination was obvious, although 
not complete. Simon Vi lie has recently stressed the diversity 
of shipping, citing the competitive potential of the many 
small firms which ran ships as adjuncts to other operations• 
That was certainly so in Auckland and Northland where 
scows, schooners and small steamers were numerous. How-
ever, we should not try to stretch this point too far without 
further analysis. Northern Steam's 28 ships totalled just 5,000 
tons in 1901, not much more than the tonnage of two of 
Union's larger coastal passenger/cargo steamers' If one 
were able to calculate the ton/mile figures for cargo carried 
coastwise, the disparity might be more significant; Union's 
larger ships working longer routes would probably have 
garnered a bigger share of the colonial market. In a 1987 
article in the Journal of Transport History, John Armstrong 
argued that using this measurement, Britishcoastalshipping's 
share of freight rose from 18% of the total to 59%, with rail's 
falling from 73% to 39%;'doing the New Zealand comparison 
may keep a numerate post-grad student busy for several months! 
Opposite: The Taranaki was an early steamer built in 
Scotland in 1865 for the Wellington-based New Zealand 
Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. lt served a variety of owners 
on long-distance coastal routes until wrecked near 
Tauranga in November 1878. Note the simple, 
uncluttered upperworks, the fact that some sail was still 
carried and that the hull is clearly influenced by the 
traditional lines of sailing vessels. 
Harraway Collection, Hocken Library £2295/18 
Left: Many early New Zealand craft came from Scottish 
shipyards. This steamer, the Penguin, (1864) joined the 
Union Company fleet in 1879, and carried passengers 
and cargo for it until February 1909 when it was 
wrecked with very heavy loss of life off Cape Terawhiti. 
Harraway Collection, Hocken Library £229640 
Left: By the early 1900s a new 
type of small Dutch or British-
built steamer began to threaten 
the Union Company's near 
monopoly of the coastal trade. 
This one, the Squall, could 
carry about 500 tons of cargo 
over long distances, but was 
small enough to enter many of 
the lesser ports. It was also 
economical to crew and 
relatively fuel efficient. In 
contrast with the hull of the 
Taranaki, the Squall's blunt, 
capacious lines are those of a 
steam ship. 
Harraway Collection, Hocken 
Library £2322/2 
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Opposite: 
A busy day on Queens Wharf, 
Wellington, c1912. Wellington 
Maritime Museum Collection 
Left: 
Bulk cargoes provided the mainstay 
of the coastal trade, with coal being 
the most important. Huge fleets of 
colliers shuttled from the West 
Coast ports, supplying bunkers for 
ships, the needs of the railways and 
of course, the industrial and 
domestic markets. This ship, the 
Ngatoro (1,140 tons), was built in 
Port Glasgow for the Blackball Coal 
Co. Ltd. a firm controlled by the 
New Zealand Shipping Company. 
Note the coaling derricks high up on 
the masts; these were used for 
transferring coal to high-sided 
overseas ships. 
Union Steam Ship Company 
Finally, we should also mention that the period brought 
changes to the maritime workforce. In 1875 there were no 
effective maritime trade unions. One had formed at Lyttelton 
in 1874 and was revived in 1879, but was again defunct by 
1880. Helped by Australian organisers, a Federated Seamen's 
Union was established in 1880. Ten years later the ships' 
officers founded the Merchant Service Guild. The 1890 Mari-
time Strike virtually destroyed the unions. The Union Com-
pany set up black lists, sponsored a tame union, The 
Shipmasters' Association, against the MerchantServiceGuild, 
used its Mutual Benefit Society to hit union earnings. Never-
theless, the unions did revive slowly. By the turn of the 
century, the big companies at least, were talking to the 
Seamen's Union. The Shipmasters' Union was practically 
defunct by the early 1900s. An issue of concern was the use of 
Asian labour. This became more pronounced in 1909 when 
P&O extended the itineraries of its ships to include a trans-
Tasman leg. 
Government intervention increased after the advent of 
the Liberals. The provision of most port facilities remained 
the responsibility of local government, in the form of harbour 
boards, but central government funded lighthouses after a 
series of major shipwrecks. A Chief Marine Board, formed in 
1862, assumed responsibility for this. The Steam Navigation 
Act of that year required the survey of coastal craft, although 
the 1865 amendment which abolished the board signalled the 
start of a long period of minimum investment and responsi-
bility. For most of last century the Marine Department was an 
appendage of the Customs Department' 
The Shipping & Seamen's Actof1877 consolidated earlier 
legislation and established criteria for the issuing of certifi-
cates of competency. After the Colonial Shipping Conference 
of 1907 the government passed the Shipping & Seamen's Act 
of 1909, which regulated the coastal and overseas trades and 
reserved the former for British flag ships. 
1905-45 
The period after 1905 brought several changes. None was 
revolutionary but, taken together, they were significant. 
The first was the sharp increase in intermodal competi-
tion. Again, rail was more important with the opening of the 
North Island Main Trunk in 1908 making big inroads into the 
coastal passenger services. Rail offered a speed that even the 
fastest steamer could not match. Union's larger trio of passen-
ger I cargo ships suffered most; the company abandoned the 
runs before World War One, transferring the ships to their 
associate company Anchor, or to the independent operator, 
the Northern Steamship Company. Union's coastal passen-
ger services retreated to those still immune to direct compe-
tition from rail - mainly the Lyttelton-Wellington route, 
where it built the Maori and Wahine, big ships of 4,000 tons. 
The shorter passenger routes operated by Northern, 
Richardsons and other smaller operators contracted further 
in the face of stiff competition. Some were hit by railways, 
others by road transport, which made its presence felt after 
the war. Buses and trucks hit the small steamers and harbour 
ferries alike. Dunedin laid up its two big steam· ferries in the 
late 1920. Richardson's Napier-Wairoa run began suffering 
from the mid-1920s and expired just a few years before World 
War Two. For Northern the' twenties and 'thirties were a time 
of retreat. 
There was a continuation of the trend to switch from 
short, intra-provincial services to longer-distance routes, es-
pecially amongst North Island companies. Of course, certain 
areas held out against the trend. The West Coast South Island, 
Nelson, East Cape, Northland etc all offered business free of 
rail competition. Some small ports, such as Raglan and Fox ton, 
defied the trend by serving fast-growing inland centres such 
as Hamilton and Palmerston North. 
But bigger ships and longer routes became more impor-
tant. From about 1904 onwards, when Auckland boatbuilder 
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and shipowner George Niccol bought the Squall, companies 
began introducing new or near-new 500-ton ships. Built to 
Dutch or British designs, these ships were more efficient than 
the older, smaller craft they replaced. They were small enough 
to enter ports such as Gisborne and the Town Wharf at 
Wanganui, while still being large enough to carry a payable 
cargo from, say, Dunedin and Oamaru to Wanganui or One-
hunga. 
They posed a threat to the Union Company, which re-
sponded by taking up a secret majority interest in all but the 
Northern Company in the years leading up to 1914. Newcom-
ers such as Canterbury Steam Shipping Co and the Maoriland 
Co. and older lines such as Richardsons and Anchor were 
bludgeoned into line, as were the smaller firms such as Red 
Pine, Wairau SSCo and Invercargill Shipping Co. Gradually 
the Union group reinvested to replace the remaining smaller, 
older ships. Some minor lines disappeared altogether. The 
process may be likened to the modern aviation industry 
where Air New Zealand has relinquished its provincial serv-
ices in favour of subsidiary and associated companies such as 
Mt Cook Airlines. 
The post-World War One period brought considerable 
technical innovation. The last scows were delivered in the 
mid-1920s and the last wooden-hulled coaster in the late 
1930s. Sail, briefly sustained by the war, lost ground steadily 
from the 1920s. From the mid-1920s onwards motor vessels 
began to supplant steamers. Ships like, for instance, Canter-
bury's Breeze and Gale and Richardson's Kopara set the new 
pattern- vessels of 600-700 tons, capable of speeds of about 
12 knots. 
Ownership patterns remained stable. Union had passed 
into full P&O control in 1917, although the local board of 
directors and management were left with extensive control of 
operational policy. No new major players entered the indus-
try and the Union Company consolidated its grip. In the early 
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After World War Two the coastal 
companies invested in a huge fleet of 
800-1,200 ton motor vessels for the 
long-distance coastal routes. 
Although highly advanced for their 
day, these ships soon succumbed to 
the pressure exerted by increasing 
port costs and competition from 
other transport modes. The Titoki 
was one of two similar 850 ton 
Dutch-built craft delivered in the 
late 1950s for the Anchor Shipping 
and Foundry Company, a Nelson-
based Union Company subsidiary, 
which dominated the Cook Strait, 
Nelson and West Coast-Wanganui/ 
New Plymouth routes. Even at this 
late stage radar has not been fitted. 
Author's collection 
1930s the company restructured its associated companies, 
mainly to stave off a belated challenge from the Holm Ship-
ping Company, into which it bought a majority shareholding. 
In the early 1930s the three major USSCo associate companies, 
Holm, Canterbury and Richardsons, restructured services to 
remove even vestigial competition. 
Employment conditions improved, albeit slowly. The re-
surgent trade unions suffered a major reversal with the defeat 
of the 1913 waterfront strike, but this time there were no 
yellow dog unions and blacklists. 
1945-75 
The end of the third quarter of the 20th century witnessed a 
change more dramatic than ever before in the history of 
commercial shipping. Compared to the shift from steam to sail 
a century earlier, the 'Second Revolution' was far more signifi-
cant. In the 1870s it had been a move in propulsion systems. In 
the 1960s and 1970s the alterations flowed through the trans-
port system from factory to the ship. It was indeed a second 
revolution. 
If you ask shipping enthusiasts for the reasons for the 
elimination of the coastal trade during the 1960s/70s, they 
will almost invariably blame the rail ferries. But was that 
really the case? I would like to suggest that there was more 
than one reason. And as with most of what I have said today, 
each requires further research. I will examine the question 
under a number of headings - markets, economics and tech-
nology. 
Firstly, though, let us look at what happened during that 
period. At the risk of oversimplifying things, we can subdi-
vide this era into three periods: 
1. During the late 1940s there was great disruption. The 
Shipping Controller still dictated ship movements and ship-
ping companies struggled to keep up with demands as they 
refurbished vessels battered by wartime experiences, tried to 
plug gaps left by lost tonnage and endeavoured to meet 
postwar demand as industry geared itself up. Many coastal/ 
trans-Tasman ships had been lost during the war or had been 
worn-out. 
2. The late 1940s to the early 1960s. This witnessed an unprec-
edented huge tonnage replacement programme. All compa-
nies made up for lost tonnage with new, high-quality motor 
vessels. Bigger ships came from British (and to a lesser extent 
Australian) yards and small boats from Dutch ones. The 
Union Company built a series of colliers for its West Coast 
routes and Anchor, Richardsons, Canterbury and Holm re-
newed their fleets with 800-1,000 ton motor vessels. The first 
purpose-built tankers appeared on the coast, along with bulk 
cement carriers towards the end of the period. 
Company ranks remained stable. The few ventures set up 
by ex-servicemen struggled, then faded out as their small, old 
ships succumbed to competition. Union turned over many of 
its minor routes to its subsidiaries. The most remarkable 
growth came from the Northern Steam Ship Company. Hith-
erto confined to ships serving the Northland and Bay of 
Plenty routes into Auckland, Northern bought or built more 
than a dozen 1,000 tanners, as many as Holm, Canterbury and 
Richardsons combined. Northern entered the long distance 
routes between the East Coast-South Island ports and Auck-
land. 
3. From the mid-1960s the unit load revolution cut into the 
coastal general trade. The arrival of the rail ferry Aramoana in 
1962 killed off the remaining small Cook Strait carriers. As 
more ferries joined the fleet, Union and Northern added a few 
RO /RO (roll-on, roll-off) ships and bulk carriers increased 
(oil and cement), the conventional ships found it impossible 
to compete. For a short while some switched to the carriage 
of bulk cargo; Canterbury and Northern took up bulk wheat 
carriage, but the trade was seasonal and subject to competi-
tion from imports. Between 1972 and 1975 almost all the 
postwar conventional fleet was withdrawn, leaving just a 
The first unit-load vessels 
were roll-on, roll-off(RO-
RO) ships. First were the 
well-known rail ferries. The 
Hawea and Wanaka, built 
for the Union Company's 
'main trunk' Auckland-
Dunedin route in 1967 and 
1970, were large, elaborate 
ships. Pacifica's current RO-
ROs are the same size, but are 
not wedded to such expensive 
terminals. The diagram shows 
the simplicity of loading. 
Cargo is wheeled aboard, 
either in vehicular form, or on 
pre-loaded pallets and 
containers on standard-sized 
Jlatdeck wagons. This cuts 
port time to a minimum. 
Union Company 
couple of ships serving Nelson and the West Coast and the 
Chathams. 
Why did this happen? I think there are several reasons: 
technological, intermodal competition, geographical and 
demographic, political and economic. 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
This, allied with economics, was probably the most crucial. 
Conventional shipping had come a long way in a century, but 
much of that evolution happened in the first part of that 
period. By the late 1930s the motor vessel was nearing the 
peak of its development. The 1950s and 1960s brought only 
modest improvements, many of which were undermined by 
high onshore costs a tour congested ports. Although speed of 
ships increased slightly (still just 12-13 knots in the 1960s) and 
cargo handling gear improved, with more 15-ton jumbo 
derricks being added, ship turn-around actually sl~wed as 
ships waited up to a week for a working berth at key ports 
such as Wellington. 
The lines did not make the switch to bulk carriage pain-
lessly. Our first tanker, the Paua of the late 1920s, carried oil 
products in cased form. The first proper tanker appeared on 
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the coast in the early 1950s. By the mid 1960s there were three 
and they had jumped from about 3,000 tons to 12,000 tons 
each. Pumping equipment enabled shipping lines to take 
advantage of economies of scale by dramatically increasing 
ship size. 
Bulk cement carriage, like oil, began conservatively, in 
bagged form. By the mid 1960s, though, each cement manu-
facturer had at least one ship. Vertical integration ofthis type 
hurt the general carriers badly. Bagged cement had been big 
business- in the case of Richardsons, about 25% of its freights. 
At the same time, the old bulk standby, coal, was begin-
ning to dry up as steam ships gave way to motor vessels, rail 
switched from coal to Diesel and electricity and domestic and 
industrial use of coal declined. 
With oil and cement changing to specialist bulk carriers 
and with coal declining, the companies' base shrank. That left 
only general cargo- flour, biscuits, beer, whiteware etc. Here 
the unit load revolution- containers and RO /RO - offered a 
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solution. We are familiar with the sight of containers, but few 
realise the efficiencies they offer. Put simply, they reduce 
time in port, the most expensive part of any transport cycle. 
Conventional ships spent considerable periods in port accru-
ing dues, ships' crew costs and waterfront labour while 
waiting for cargo to be assembled in nearby sheds and made 
up in slings and hoisted aboard. Unit load speeds things up 
by reducing cargo to standard lots that do not have to be 
made up alongside the ship. Instead, major shippers can do 
the packing hundreds of kilometres away in their own facto-
ries, using cheaper labour. Containers can be assembled out 
on the open behind the berth, so that the entire cargo is ready 
before the ship reaches port. This dramatically reduces turna-
round time. It leads to further economies. Since turnaround 
often limited ship size (shippers wanted to offer frequency), 
this can be increased, offering further savings. 
The downside to the 'second revolution' was that the new 
ships were expensive, especially for companies that had just 
completed a major fleet replacement programme and whose 
ships were still quite new. Union did make some modest 
improvements, building two large ferries for the Lyttelton run 
and the Wanaka and Hawea for the main Auckland/Dunedin 
route, Northern built a small RO/RO for the abortive One-
hunga/South Island one and New Zealand Unit Express used 
a tug and barge combination that met considerable union 
resistance. But no one else had the money for new ships. 
INTERMODAL COMPETITION 
Unfortunately for the shipping lines, others moved more 
quickly. New Zealand Rail had asked Union to run its new 
Cook Strait service during the 1950s, but the company dith-
ered too long and New Zealand Rail placed its own order for 
the Aramoana. That ship revolutionised long-distance trans-
port in New Zealand. Previously the need to unload and 
reload wagons at either side of Cook Strait had made inter-
island rail-haulage prohibitively expensive and had confined 
rail/sea competition to short/medium haul business within 
either island. Now the coast was clear (quite literally!) and 
New Zealand Rail could run trains straight through, quicker 
and cheaper. Unlike the shipping lines, it could offer a direct 
door-to-door service to inland centres and the rapidly ex-
panding suburbs. From the late 1960s onwards, New Zealand 
Rail began working closely with freight forwarders such as 
Alltrans, to increase their market share. 
GEOGRAPHICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC 
The postwar era intensified the northwards drift, with areas 
north ofTaupo growing faster than the South Island or south-
ern North Island. Inland centres such as Taupo, Rotorua, 
Hamilton and Palmerston North could not be served effi-
ciently by coastal shipping. The East Coast South Island ports, 
long the mainstay of the general cargo trade, grew slowly or 
even declined. The sale of a flour mill licence and the shift of 
its plant to Tauranga in the late 1950s, for example, cost the 
Port of Oamaru almost a quarter of its general cargo. 
POLITICAL 
The Third Labour Government's three year freeze on rail 
charges hastened the small ships' demise. Labour bought the 
Coastal Trader, to replace the Union Co service, but that did 
little to reverse a long-term trend. The rail freeze in times of 
high inflation only hastened the end; by 1976 the Shipping 
Corporation's Coastal Trader was struggling. 
ECONOMIC 
All the above factors fed into the last, economics. The simple 
truth was that the coastal fleet priced itself off the market, 
Opposite: 
Coal has gone, but bulk cargo remains important to the coastal 
fleet's three oil tankers, LPG tanker and three cement carriers. 
The Kotuku and Kuaka can carnJ over 25,000 tons of petroleum 
products. Author's collection 
though not quite in the manner usually reckoned. In the past 
commentators have blamed the seagoing unions for much of 
the collapse of the industry. The following figures suggest 
that the smoking gun can be found elsewhere. They are taken 
from the business records of the Canterbury Steam Shipping 
Company, a Union Company subsidiary. Each column shows 
the break-down of costs for a vessel named Storm. The ships 
were different, but the routes served were essentially the 
same: 
Operating Costs CSSCo 1916 and 196610 
1916 1966 
Crew costs 21.7% 19.2% 
Port charges / agents' commissions- 11 .8% 8.3% 
Fuel / repairs I stores I insurance etc 27.8% 10.6% 
Waterfront labour 19.1% 48.5% 
The dramatic increase in onshore costs leaps out instantly. 
Whereas waterfront labour costs absorbed less than 20% of 
ships' earnings in 1916, that had climbed to almost half ships' 
earnings 50 years later. Little wonder, therefore, that coas tal 
shipping had been almost forced out of the non-bulk trades 
by 1975. 
CONCLUSION 
If this paper has achieved anything, it should have under-
lined the fact that New Zealand's transport history is still 
little understood. While enthusiasts have catalogued the 
hardware, few historians have found the time to ask the 
important questions about ownership patterns, profitability, 
market share and competi tion. There is much to be done! 
This talk was given at the tenth annual Stout Research Centre 
Conference, 'The Sea', Victoria University of Wellington, July 
1993. 
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